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DEVELOPING PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING
REQUISITES
Isidore Goodman*
The Tax Revision Act of 1942 introduced a new concept
into the pension and profit-sharing area: prohibited discrimina-
tion. A tax qualified plan must not discriminate in favor of em-
ployees who are officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly com-
pensated.
After provision was made in 1921 for exemption of a
trust forming part of a stock bonus or profit-sharing plan of an
employer for the exclusive benefit of some or all of his employ-
ees,1 and for over two decades thereafter, the requirements were
fairly simple and few interpretative rules were established. How-
ever, World War II brought a dramatic rise in tax rates and
deductions were sought for plan contributions. Efforts were also
exerted to curb inflation by way of deferment through pension
and profit-sharing plans which were to provide for substantial
coverage on a non-discriminatory basis.
A new law was enacted and new rules were promulgated.
Some rules proved to be temporary,2 but others are still in full
force and effect. This article will examine some of the particu-
larly important rules in current practice.
WEIGHTED ALLOCATIONS
A qualified profit-sharing plan must provide a definite, pre-
determined formula for allocating the contributions made to the
plan among the participants, and for distributing the accumulated
* Chief, Pension Trust Branch, Internal Revenue Service. The opinions
expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Internal Revenue Service.
1. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 247.
2. Thirty percent limitation on employer contributions to provide benefits
for stockholder employees, I.T. 3674, 1944 CuM. BULL. 315, revoked by I.T.
4020, 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 61; definite contribution formula for profit-sharing
plans, Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.165-1(a)(2) (1955), revoked by T.D. 6189, 1956-2
CUM. BULL. 972, amend'g Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.165-1(a)(2) (1955), and Treas.
Reg. 111 § 29.165-1(a) (1944), and omitted from Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)
(1) (ii) (1971); unrestricted right of employees to designate their bene-
ficiaries, P.S. No. 19, Aug. 29, 1944, revoked by Rev. Rul. 54-398, 1954-2
CuM. BULL. 239.
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funds.' The purpose is to designate the shares of the respective
participants and to preclude discrimination in favor of the upper
echelon employees. Variations in contributions or benefits, how-
ever, may be provided so long as the plan, viewed as a whole for
the benefit of employees in general with all its attendant circum-
stances, does not discriminate in favor of employees who are of-
ficers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated.4
Accordingly, various methods are used for allocating contri-
butions among participants. Some take into account a years-of-
service factor; others gear contributions to predetermined retire-
ment benefits, which may or may not affect the qualification of
the plan.
Units of Retirement Benefits
The profit-sharing deduction limits do not apply to any trust
designed to provide benefits upon retirement and covering a pe-
riod of years, if under the plan the amounts to be contributed by
the employer can be determined actuarially.5 A plan designed to
provide benefits for employees or their beneficiaries, to be paid
upon retirement, or over a period of years after retirement, will
be considered a pension plan if the employer contributions can
be determined actuarially on the basis of definitely determinable
benefits.' Distributions under a profit-sharing plan, on the other
hand, consist of accumulated contributions and the increments
thereon, without regard to definitely determinable benefits.
Where the benefits are so determinable, a pension plan, rather
than a profit-sharing plan, may be involved. Nevertheless, some
profit-sharing plans contain pension features. The most common
shared feature is a years-of-service factor. The objective is to re-
ward long-service employees with additional credits. The service
feature is permissible where it is not used to predetermine, but
merely to increase benefits and does not result in prohibited dis-
crimination.
In one type of profit-sharing plan, the employer's contri-
butions are used to provide benefits allocated in proportion to the
cost of providing units of retirement annuities in proportion to
annual compensation, where the cost of such units is dependent
upon the sex and age of the respective participants in the year of
allocation. The plan is funded under a deposit administration
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (1971).
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(a)(2)(iii) (1971).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(3)(A) (penultimate sentence).
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1971).
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group annuity contract.7 The allocation formula provides a two
step formula for calculating priorities to be used in each year of
the plan. The first step is the allocation to each participant's
account of that proportion of the contribution which the cost of
providing him with a monthly retirement benefit of one percent
of the first $350 of his average monthly earnings, plus two per-
cent of his average monthly earnings in excess of $350, bears to
the total cost of furnishing such benefits. However, if the annual
contribution is more than sufficient to furnish all participants with
such benefits, only that part of the annual contribution necessary
to furnish such benefits shall be allocated as provided in this part
of the calculation. The second step allocates the remainder of
the annual contribution in the same proportion as the cost of pro-
viding such participant with a monthly retirement benefit of one
percent of his average monthly earnings bears to the total cost of
furnishing such benefits for all participants. The result of such
an allocation formula is that larger portions are used for older
employees of the same sex, as measured by current compensation.
In a pension plan, contributions are allocated in accordance
with the cost of proportionate benefits. The employer undertakes
to provide definite retirement benefits in proportion to compen-
sation and/or service for each participant. If contributions to
the plan are continued as intended, each employee who fulfills
the requirements will receive his contemplated benefits. If the
plan or contribution thereunder should terminate prematurely, re-
sulting in discrimination in favor of the original older group, the
restrictions on contributions to provide benefits for the top twenty-
five employees may necessitate a reallocation of credits to limit
such discrimination."
In a profit-sharing plan, however, since the employer con-
tributions are geared to profits, there is no assurance that contri-
butions will be continued and, accordingly, there is no way of de-
termining what the ultimate retirement benefits will be. Neither
is there a limitation on benefits for the top twenty-five employees,
as there is under a pension plan. Although each participant is
furnished with a retirement annuity in proportion to his monthly
compensation for each year that a contribution is made, the value
of the annuities purchased for the older participants is greatly in
7. A deposit administration group annuity contract is a funding de-
vice that operates like a trust, except that the funds are held by aninsurance company for the purpose of purchasing single premium annui-
ties as employees retire. The rate of interest and the single premiumimmediate annuity rates applicable at retirement are usually guaranteed
by the insurance company as to contributions during the first five years.
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(c) (1971).
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excess of the value for the younger participants. If the older
participants are upper echelon employees, the prohibited discrim-
ination is bound to occur. Only where the same relative contri-
butions are continued fairly evenly each year is there any assur-
ance that the ultimate benefits will take account of changes in
compensation.
The purpose of a profit-sharing plan is to provide for par-
ticipation'in the employer's profits by his employees or their bene-
ficiaries. Accordingly, the measure for determining discrimina-
tion is the allocation of the employer's contributions from profits,
even though such allocated contributions may be accumulated
from varying periods for employees of different ages.' A "units
of retirement" plan may qualify for tax benefits in one year but,
in its operation, may fail to qualify in future years. Accord-
ingly, favorable advance determination letters are not issued on
such plans. 10
Compensation and Service Units
Service factors are included in the allocation formula by
weighting compensation in several ways. One way is to add units
for compensation" to units for service. 2  The total contribution
is then allocated in the proportion the total units of each partic-
ipant bears to the total for all." Another approach is to multi-
ply compensation units by service units and then divide by the
aggregate units for all participants.' 4 The resulting fraction is then
applied to the total contribution to determine the amount to be al-
located to each participant. Still another method is to segregate
participants by categories which are based on service over a period
of years, and then weight each category by a factor which will
provide a greater share for longer service.5
Some plans with weighted allocations pay compensation at a
specified amount in order to limit the allocation that may be made
for highly paid participants.'" However, the result, not the method,
controls.
9. Rev. Rul. 57-77, 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 158.
10. Rev. Proc. 69-6, § 3.01, 11(c), 1969-1 CuM. BULL 396, 397.
11. E.g., one unit for each full $100.
12. E.g., one unit for each full year of service.
13. Rev. Rul. 68-653, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 177.
14. Rev. Rul. 68-654, 1968-2 CuM. BULL. 179.
15. E.g., class 1, one to five years, in proportion to compensation
only; class 2, over five but not over 10 years, in proportion to twice compen-
sation; and so forth.




Where employer contributions are allocated in proportion to
employee contributions weighted by years of service, and the
highly paid employees also have longer service, prohibited dis-
crimination will result. In a recent case,' 7 employer contributions
were allocated to the accounts of participants in the proportion
that each participant's weighted contribution bore to the total
weighted contributions of all participants. The weighted contri-
bution of each participant was determined by multiplying his con-
tribution by a percentage which varied with his years of service,
ranging from 100 percent for service of less than two years to
200 percent for service of fifteen years or more.
The president of the employer-corporation had the longest
service and participated in allocations to a greater extent than did
other employees. The employer contended that the formula for
allocating contributions was chosen in order to encourage em-
ployees to remain with the business. The argument was advanced
that this objective is a legitimate business purpose and, therefore,
even though it resulted in the president receiving more favorable
treatment, this is not the kind of discrimination that is prohibited
by statute.
The Tax Court countered by reasoning that the Income Tax
Regulations recognize that years of service may be taken into con-
sideration in allocating contributions under a qualified profit-shar-
ing plan, provided that the allocation on such basis does not re-
sult in discrimination in favor of employees in the upper cate-
gories. The history of the regulation prohibiting discrimina-
tion"' furnishes strong support for accepting the validity of the reg-
ulations as interpreted.' 9
The Court continued with the observation that an employer
may have a number of reasons for establishing a proft-sharing
plan, and has considerable latitude in choosing the type of plan
which will accomplish the desired objectives. In McMenamy, if
the employer contributions had been allocated in proportion to
compensation, the plan would not have been challenged. Fur-
thermore, credits for years of service could have been given with-
17. Bernard McMenamy, Contractor, Inc., 71 U.S. Tax Cas. 9385(8th Cir. 1970), ajf'g 54 T.C. 1057 (1970).
18. The regulations and rulings in point were adopted in 1944, shortly
after enactment of the Tax Revision Act of 1942, which added to the tax
structure the concept of prohibited discrimination. Twice, once in 1954 and
again in 1962, Congress considered the requirements for qualification of a plan,
but did nothing to indicate any disapproval of that provision of the regulations
or administrative interpretations.
19. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967).
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out favoring the upper level employees. If, for example, service
credits had been limited to service performed after the adoption
of the plan, such credits might have been nondiscriminatory.
Since the president was the sole stockholder, there was no
need to grant him credit for past service in order to encourage
him to remain with the corporation. By granting such credit,
however, he was assured of a more favorable allocation than any
other participant. Even if, in time, other employees might also
qualify for the higher rates, in the meantime proportionately larger
allocations would be made for the president.
Moreover, the employer was under no obligation to con-
tinue comparable contributions in later years when other employ-
ees might qualify for more favorable weighting. Under a profit-
sharing plan, no contribution would be required in later years
if there were no profits. Further, even if there were profits, the
plan required only a nominal or prescribed contribution. The
board of directors, therefore, might decide not to continue con-
tributions to the same extent as before. If, in some future year,
an examination established that the plan had been operated in a
discriminatory manner, the statute of limitations would prevent
retroactive action.
Since there is no obligation to continue contributions in later
years to the extent applied when the president derived benefits,
the plan must be judged on the basis of the facts existing in the
years involved. For such years, the weighted allocation used in
McMenamy discriminated in favor of the president of the em-
ployer-corporation.
Rewarding Employees' Status
Another case which involved weighting factors, Philip M.
Auner,2 ° received novel treatment. A medical clinic established
a profit-sharing plan and provided an allocation formula that took
into consideration not only years of service but also training and
experience. A participant's service points were multiplied by the
number of points allotted for training and experience, resulting
in a percentage that was applied to compensation.21 During the
three years of the plan's operation, less than 5 percent of em-
ployer contributions was allocated to the lower paid supporting
20. 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9246 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g and remand'g 69-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9288 (D. 111. 1969).
21. The service points ranged from one to five, based on service and
training, and experience points were awarded in accordance with the extent
of the individual's experience in previous similar employment and time spent in
specific types of training.
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personnel, whose compensation was equal to about 13 percent of
the total compensation of all participants. On the other hand,
95 percent of such contributions was allocated to the doctors
whose compensation equalled about 87 percent of the total.
It was contended on behalf of the clinic that the point for-
mula was designed for the purpose of forming a strongly knit or-
ganization, attracting competent and well-trained men and women,
retaining competent employees, and encouraging additional train-
ing and education for all employees at all levels. The appellate
court, however, pointed out that the issue is whether the plan
discriminated in favor of the officers or highly compensated em-
ployees; if it did, whether the formula was thought to achieve
employment objectives is irrelevant. The officers and highly
paid employees received disproportionally greater allocations of
employer contributions than the lower paid participants. This
resulted in prohibited discrimination.
APPLICATION OF FORFEITURES
A qualified plan must provide that upon its termination or
complete discontinuance of contributions thereunder, the rights
of all employees to benefits accrued to the time of such termina-
tion or discontinuance are to be nonforfeitable to the extent
funded or credited.22 The plan must additionally provide for
full vesting of an employee's interest upon attaining normal re-
tirement age or a stated retirement age, and completion of the
service and other reasonable requirements set forth in the plan.23
Other provisions are also used, ranging from full and immediate
vesting through different forms of graduated vesting to no vest-
ing until normal or stated retirement age.24
Forfeitures arise in cases where there is anything less than
full and immediate vesting. In the case of a pension plan, for-
feitures must not be applied to increase the benefits any em-
ployee would otherwise receive under the plan. 25  The amounts
so forfeited must be used as soon as possible to reduce the em-
ployer's contributions under the plan.26 In the case of a profit-
sharing or stock bonus plan, provision may be made for the use
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6 (1971)
23. Rev. Rul. 66-11, 1966-1 CuM. BULL. 71; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 5(g),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 76.
24. Rev. Rul 71-151, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 123; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 5(c),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 75.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(8); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i)
(1971); Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 2(m), 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 59, 66.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-7(a) (1971); Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 7(a), 1969-2
CUM. BULL. 59, 79.
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of forfeitures to reduce employer contributions that otherwise
would be made. Such treatment is not required, but whatever
provision is made must not result in prohibited discrimina-
tion.27
If the formula for allocating employer contributions is not
weighted, an allocation of forfeitures among remaining partici-
pants in accordance with such formula is usually satisfactory.
Problems arise, however, where other methods of allocating for-
feitures are used.
Account Balances
In some cases, forfeitures are allocated in accordance with
the account balances of the remaining participants. Whether this
results in prohibited discrimination will depend on whether the
upper-echelon employees are favored by the method of allocation.
If account balances consist only of employer contributions that
had been allocated in accordance with current compensation,
without weighting, a uniform treatment would result and an allo-
cation of forfeitures by the same method would quite likely be
nondiscriminatory. Where weighting is used or other elements,
such as employee contributions, are included in the account bal-
ances, longer service employees may have proportionately greater
shares. If these employees are in the upper-echelon group, an
allocation in accordance with account balances will result in pro-
hibited discrimination.
If the allocation formula takes into account factors other
than current compensation, it will have to be established on a
year-to-year basis that their use has not resulted in prohibited dis-
crimination. Account balances are merely one of several factors
that may be considered in allocating forfeitures if discrimination
does not thereby result.28
Suspense Accounts
Problems arise at times when forfeited funds have been
placed in a suspense account pending reallocation, and the trust is
terminated before reallocation can be effectuated. The question
is, "May such funds revert to the employer?"
• All funds in an exempt profit-sharing or stock bonus trust
must be allocated to participants in accordance with a prede-
termined formula.29 No reserves are to be established by with-
27. Rev. Rul. 71-313, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 203; see also, Rev. Rul. 69-421,
pt. 7(b), 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 79.
28. Rev. Rul. 71-4, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 120.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii, iii) (1971).
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holding allocations from participants. If, however, suspense ac-
counts are temporarily maintained for subsequent credits pending
allocation, provision is to be made for ascertaining the re-
spective interests of the participants in such accounts and these
interests are to be included in the distribution."0
Further, allocations to participants under profit-sharing and
stock bonus plans are not predicated upon amounts actuarially
necessary to provide stipulated retirement benefits.3 Conse-
quently, there can be no reversion of any kind under such
plans.32
Affiliated Groups
A single plan and trust may be maintained by a group of
employers, regardless of whether or not affiliated, but each em-ployer separately must satisfy all applicable requirements as though
he were the only employer maintaining the plan."3 Problems com-
monly arise over the application of forfeitures in such plans. Their
solution requires a determination of whose employees forfeited,
and whose employees are to benefit from the forfeitures.
A plan will not qualify unless under the trust instrument itis impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities
with respect to employees and their benefits under the trust, for
any part of the corpus or income to be used for, or diverted to,purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of the employees
or their beneficiaries." Since, in a multi-employer plan, each
employer separately must satisfy all applicable requirements, 5
the employees for whose exclusive benefit the funds are to be used
are the employees of the contributing employer. The amounts
contributed for, and allocated to, employees of one employer
may not be used for the benefit of employees of another em-
ployer.36
30. Rev. Rul. 70-125, 1970-1 CUM. BULL. 87; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 2(t),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 68.31. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a)(3)(A); Treas. Reg. 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1971), to the effect that a plan designed to provide benefits to be paid
upon retirement or over a period of years after retirement will be considered a
pension plan.
32. Rev. Rul. 71-149, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 118; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 3(e),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 69.
33. Rev. Rul. 69-250, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 116.
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(2).
35. Rev. Rul. 69-250, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 116.36. Rev. Rul. 69-570, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 91. E.g., Amounts forfeited by
employees of employer A may not be used for the benefit of employees of
employer B, but only for employees of employer A.
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Deductions are also frequently at issue. For a contribution
to be deductible, it must first constitute an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense, 7 or an expense for the production of in-
come,38 before being subjected to the deductions limitations.89
A payment by one for services rendered to another is not an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense of the payor. No deduction
is allowed for such payment, except in the case of a profit-shar-
ing plan (or stock bonus plan geared to profits) of an affiliated
group,4" where the profit-sharing companies may make up a
contribution for a loss member and obtain a deduction therefor
within prescribed limits. 41 In other cases, the only method of al-
locating contributions ainong employers that is acceptable for de-
duction purposes is a method that will actually reflect the contri-
butions by each employer for the benefit of his employees.42
Forfeitures stem from employer contributions and the incre-
ments thereon. An employer contribution which had originally
been allocated to employee A, is reallocated because of forfeitures,
inuring to the benefit of employee B. In the case of a plan of a
single employer there is no problem in determining whose employ-
ees are involved; both A and B are employees of the contributing
employer. Similarly, in the case of a multi-employer plan where
the accounting method permits direct tracing, the employees of
each employer are identifiable and forfeitures are allocated di-
rectly to the remaining employees of the contributing employer.
There are cases, however, where it is not feasible to deter-
mine whose employee an individual may be at any given time.
For example, in one case,43 a chain of restaurant corporations
with common ownership found it necessary to shift employees
between stores as the volume of business varied at the different
locations. Those in the business section were usually busiest during
the luncheon period, while those in outlying areas did the most
business in the late afternoon and in the evening. When the man-
ager of a store found that he needed more help, he called the
management office and asked for the required number of addi-
tional people. Management then contacted one or more of the
other restaurants and arranged for the necessary transfer. Thus,
an employee might be working in restaurant A during the lunch
period, in B during the cocktail hour, and in C at dinner time,
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
38. Id. at § 212.
39. Id. at § 404(a).
40. Id. at § 1504.
41. Id. at § 404(a)(3)(B).
42. Rev. Rul. 70-532, 1970-2 CUM. BULL. 95.
43. Rev. Rul. 71-148, 1971-1 CUM. BULL. 117.
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with varying hours at each place each day. He was paid by the
management corporation, however, for total service at all loca-
tions, without a breakdown as to time actually put in at each
place.
Management, in turn, billed each corporation on a pro rata
basis in accordance with the percentage of the gross receipts of
each to the total gross receipts of all. If Company A had 10
percent of the aggregate receipts, it was charged with 10 percent
of the aggregate payroll. The employees who were moved about
rendered services to the employers participating in the plan. Since
it was not feasible to ascertain the origin of forfeited amounts
and since a reasonable allocation of total payroll was made among
the respective corporations, the same method could be used in
allocating forfeitures. However, the method must be followed con-
sistently without resulting in prohibited discrimination. 44
FEEDER PLANS
A qualified plan must be maintained for the exclusive bene-
fit of employees or their beneficiaries.45 A stock bonus or profit-
sharing plan is not a plan for the exclusive benefit of employees
in general if the funds therein may be used to relieve the em-
ployer from contributing to a pension plan operating concurrently
and covering the same employees.46 It is a prohibited feeder
plan when its funds can be siphoned off and used to pay for
pensions which otherwise would be provided by employer contri-
butions. The fact that the same employees are beneficiaries
under both plans is immaterial to its qualification if the employer
also benefits by being relieved of a commitment. A commitment
is not necessarily synonymous with a legal liability. The employer
may provide that the employees can look only to the funds under
the plan and thus prevent a liability for future contributions.
While the plan is in existence, however, the employer benefits
by realizing an economic gain through the services of the partici-
pants.47
This does not mean that an employer cannot, under any cir-
cumstances, have both a pension and a profit-sharing plan which
covers the same employees. Where employees' pension benefits
are not reduced by an accumulation in a profit-sharing plan, there
is no problem. Problems do, however, arise where the employees'
44. Rev. Rul. 70-532, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 95.
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (1971).
47. U.S. v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12-13 (6th Cir. 1960); rev'g
59-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9178, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 433 (D. Tenn. 1959).
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pension benefits are affected by their interests in a profit-sharing
plan.
Offsetting Pension Benefits
A provision for offsetting benefits under a pension plan by
amounts received under a profit-sharing plan, operating concur-
rently and covering the same employees, disqualifies both plans.
For example, in one case,48 an employer established a profit-
sharing plan which he intended to meet the applicable require-
ments for qualification. He also established a pension plan, cover-
ing the same employees and providing a monthly retirement bene-
fit after age sixty-five equal to 50 percent of each employee's
average annual compensation, offset by the actuarial value of any
amounts to which the employee might be entitled under the prof-
it-sharing plan. Since the funds held in an employee's account
under the profit-sharing plan were to be used to reduce the em-
ployee's pension benefits, the employer would have been relieved
from contributing to that extent under the pension plan. Hence,
the profit-sharing plan was not for the exclusive benefit of em-
ployees in general and failed to be qualified.
Further, in order for the pension plan to qualify, it had to
provide for definitely determinable benefits.49 The determina-
tion of the amount of retirement benefits and the contributions
to provide such benefits may not be dependent on profits. In
this case, however, the amount of pension benefits was contingent
upon the amount available under the profit-sharing plan. This, in
turn, depended upon the amount of the employer's profits and his
willingness to make contributions from them. Under these cir-
cumstances, the benefits the employee would receive from the
pension plan were not definitely determinable. Accordingly, the
pension plan also failed of qualification. 0
48. Rev. Rul. 69-502, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 89.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1971).
50. Some such combination pension and profit-sharing plans had been acted
on favorably prior to the issuance of Rev. Rul. 69-502, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 89.
Accordingly, under the authority contained in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7805(b), such plans are not treated as unqualified solely by reason of the
offsetting provision if such provision had been eliminated by appropriate
amendment before the end of the first taxable year beginning after October
6, 1969, the date of publication of the Revenue Ruling. Furthermore, union-
negotiated plans previously held qualified are not disqualified solely because of
the offsetting provision if such provision had been eliminated by appropriate
amendment by the later of (1) the end of the first taxable year beginning after
October 6, 1969, or, (2) six months after the expiration of the applicable
collective bargaining agreement in effect on October 6, 1969. In non-nego-
tiated plans, the amendments must be effective for all purposes not later than




Although when pension benefits are contingent upon profits
and contributions by the employer both plans will fail, where the
amount of offset pension benefits is definitely determinable when
the plan is established and is not affected by future contribu-
tions to the profit-sharing plan, the status for qualification of
each of the two plans is not adversely affected by having two
plans. For example, in one case an employer had maintained a
qualified profit-sharing plan for several years and then established
a pension plan covering the same employees.,' The pension
plan provided for a monthly retirement benefit, commencing at
age sixty-five, equal to 50 percent of a participant's monthly
career average compensation, which was reduced by an amount of
deferred monthly retirement benefit actuarially equivalent to the
amount standing to the participant's credit in the profit-sharing
plan at the time the pension plan was established.
The profit-sharing paln continued in effect after the pen-
sion plan was established and the employer expected to make
annual contributions thereto out of profits. Contributions to the
profit-sharing plan and trust earnings credited after that time
would not reduce or otherwise affect the benefits to be received un-
der the pension plan. The effect, accordingly, was the same as
being provided a smaller pension benefit. Provision could prop-
erly be made for a 40 percent pension benefit; if, for example,
the actuarial value of the prior profit-sharing accumulation had
been ten percent, then a pension benefit of 50 percent less
that actuarial value would be equivalent. Hence, the pension bene-
fits were definitely determinable.
Contributions to the profit-sharing plan and to trust earnings
during the period that both plans are maintained, would not re-
duce or otherwise affect the employer's commitment to make con-
tributions to the pension plan. Furthermore, the employer could
never be required to make contributions to the pension plan for
the amount by which benefits were reduced, and this reduction
in benefits was known at the time the pension plan was put into
effect. Thus, the employer's commitment to provide pension
benefits was definitely determinable.
The pension benefits were definitely determinable and prof-
it-sharing funds were not used to relieve the employer of a com-
for union-negotiated plans, the amendments must be made effective not later
than the first day of the first taxable year beginning after October 6, 1969, or
the date of expiration of applicable collective bargaining agreement.
51. Rev. Rul. 70-578, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 86.
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mitment under the pension plan. Neither plan, therefore, was
adversely affected because of the method used in providing pen-
sion benefits.
Offsetting Profit-Sharing Contributions
Unlike a method which offsets pension benefits by profit-
sharing accumulations, a provision by which an amount which
otherwise would have been contributed under a profit-sharing
plan is reduced by the amount of contributions to a pension plan
does not prevent either plan from qualifying.
For example, in one case an employer maintained both a 10
percent money-purchase pension plan and a profit-sharing plan
calling for employer contributions equal to the lesser of 12
percent of net income or twenty percent of compensation, minus
the amount of contributions under the pension plan.52 The reduc-
tion was in the profit-sharing plan, not in the pension plan.
Contributions under the pension plan were fixed, without being
geared to profits, in conformance with the Regulations appli-
cable to money-purchase pension plans.5 3 Further, contributions
under the profit-sharing plan would not reduce the employer's con-
tributions under the pension plan.
The principle is not confined to money-purchase plans; the
important factor is that the amount that otherwise would be con-
tributed to the profit-sharing plan is reduced by the amount con-
tributed to the pension plan, rather than the converse.
TERMINATIONS AND CURTAILMENTS
A qualified plan must be a permanent program. 54 The em-
ployer may reserve the right to change or terminate the plan, and
to discontinue contributions thereunder, if there is a valid business
reason for so acting. The plan must comply with the require-
ments for qualification in all respects, both at the time the plan is
adopted, and throughout its entire operation, including its termi-
nation. 55
Valid Business Reason
Plans are terminated for various reasons. The most com-
mon is a discontinuance of the employer's business brought about
52. Rev. Rul. 70-371, 1970-2 CuM. BULL. 85.
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1971).
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1971).
55. Rev. Rul. 69-24, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 110; superseding Mim. 6136,
1947-1 CuM. BULL. 58, as modified by Rev. Rul. 55-60, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 37.
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by bankruptcy, death, retirement, sale or liquidation. In some
cases, the business is merged with a company that has no plan
of its own and does not wish to continue the plan of the previous
employer for the employees taken over; in other cases the acquir-
ing company may have a plan which extends to all eligible
employees. In either situation the plan of the previous employer
is terminated. Financial considerations also give rise to termi-
nations. Bankruptcy and insolvency are extreme examples; addi-
tionally, sound and valid business demands may require the use of
the funds for such other purposes as plant expansion, inventory
increase, or business extension. Other reasons for termination are
substitution of another plan, union demands for different benefits,
changes in location, change in product or type of business, and
failure to realize the objectives of the plan caused by lack of
employee interest or a scarcity of eligible employees.
The circumstances surrounding termination must be suffi-
cient to establish that the plan was not adopted in anticipation of
a short existence after providing for employees in whose favor dis-
crimination is prohibited.5 6 Each case must be determined on its
facts, and a reason found satisfactory in one case may not be con-
trolling in another. For example, in one case, a company took
on a new force to work on a five-year project. A plan was es-
tablished providing for deferred vesting, but on completion of
the project, the new force was discharged leaving only three
stockholder-employees and a bookkeeper to benefit from the plan.
Accordingly, it was held that the plan from its inception was not
a bona fide program for the exclusive benefit of employees in
general, but was merely an arrangement to siphon off profits
for subsequent distribution primarily to stockholders. 57
Another common situation in plan terminations involves a
frequently used method of funding pension benefits on the basis
of "oldest first." The cost of benefits for older employees is
fully paid in a relatively short time, while the cost for younger
employees, spread over their remaining years to retirement, will
not be met for a much longer time. This is satisfactory in a
continuing plan where every participant receives his contem-
plated benefit in accordance with the formula set forth in the
plan. If, however, the older participants are upper-echelon em-
ployees and the plan is terminated soon after their benefits have
56. Rev. Rul. 69-25, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 113; superseding P.S. No. 7,
July 29, 1944, and P.S. No. 52, Aug. 9, 1945, as modified by Rev. Rul. 55-60,
1955-1 CuM. BULL. 37, 39.
57. Rev. Rul. 69-24, Situation 3, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 110, 112; superseding




been fully funded while those for junior employees either have
not been funded at all, or are not funded to the same extent
as the higher-paid, prohibited discrimination arises."
For example, under a fifty percent fixed-benefit plan, the
single lump-sum cost of funding a straight life annuity of $25,-
000 for a sixty-four year old man earning $50,000 a year, com-
mencing at normal retirement age sixty-five, on the basis of ac-
tuarial factors submitted, is approximately $295,000, or 590 per-
cent of his compensation. The level annual cost of a $2,500 an-
nuity for a twenty-five year old man earning $5,000 a year, com-
mencing at age sixty-five, and using the same factors, is approx-
imately $345, or 6.9 percent of his compensation. There is no
discrimination in stated benefits while the plan is in operation,
since a uniform rate of 50 percent is provided for all participants,
but discrimination arises on termination because of the variance
in funding. Participants then receive only what is available for
them. The older employees may receive full, or almost full, bene-
fits, while the younger employees may receive little or nothing. If
the older people are upper-echelon employees, as is usually the
case, the termination is discriminatory.
Termination Rule
The prescribed method of limiting prohibited discrimination
on termination of a pension or annuity plan is to restrict the
contributions that may be used to provide benefits for the upper-
echelon employees. For this purpose, upper echelon employees
are those who are the twenty-five highest paid5" at the time the
plan is established and whose anticipated annual pension exceeds
$1,500. The restrictions become applicable if: 60
(a) The plan is terminated within ten years after it is estab-
lished, or
(b) The benefits of an employee among the top twenty-
five become payable within ten years after the plan is
established, or
(c) The benefits of an employee among the top twenty-five
become payable after the plan has been in effect for ten
years, but its current costs for the first ten years have
not been fully funded.
In the case of an employee who is among the top twenty-five
and whose benefits become payable within ten years after the
58. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1971).
59. All employees if total employment is lower.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(c)(2) (1971).
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plan is established, the restrictions are to remain applicable until
the plan has been in effect for ten years; however, if the current
costs have then been fully funded the restrictions no longer apply
to such employee. Restrictions are not required in the case of
a money-purchase pension plan under which all participants are
treated alike with respect to the employer contributions and the
increments thereon. The contributions, however, must bear a un-
iform relationship to each employee's total compensation and no
employee may obtain a disproportionate benefit because of his
age or the method of funding."'
The requirement for restrictions is referred to as the "Termi-
nation Rule." The plan must restrict employer contributions used
to provde benefits for any of the twenty-five highest paid em-
plocees so that such contributions will not exceed, over the ten
year period, the greater of:
(a) $20,000, or
(b) The product resulting by multiplying 20 percent of
the employee's annual compensation, not in excess of
$50,000, by the number of years between the date of
establishment of the plan and its termination. 62
To illustrate the applicability of the rule, let us assume that
a plan has been in effect for eight years, the annual compensa-
tion of the employee involved is $30,000, and that $85,000 had
been contributed on his behalf in accordance with the funding
method under the plan. The restricted portion would then be
$37,000.63
The unrestricted balance of $48,000 may be used for the
payment of benefits, but the remainder of $37,000 continues to
be restricted for the remaining two years. The restricted portion
is released as the current costs are fully met.
The restricted portion, however, may be exceeded for the
purpose of making current retirement income benefit payments
to retired employees under the following circumstances:6 4
(a) Employer contributions on behalf of an employee sub-
ject to the restrictions must be applied either (i) to pro-
61. Rev. Rul. 69-415, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 96.
62. If the benefits of an employee become payable within 10 years from the
date the plan is established, 20 percent of compensation is to be multiplied
by the number of years from the establishment of the plan to the date the
benefits become payable. Also, where the current costs have not been fully
funded for the first 10 years, 20 percent of compensation is to be multiplied
by the number of years from the date the plan was established to the date of
the failure to meet the full current costs.
63. $85,000 less 20% of $30,000 for 8 years.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(c)(4) (1971).
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vide level amounts of annuity in the basic form of
benefit under the plan at retirement (or, if he has al-
ready retired, beginning immediately), or (ii) to pro-
vide level amounts of annuity in an optional form of
benefit under the plan if the level amount of annuity
under such optional form is not greater than the level
amount of annuity under the basic form of benefit under
the plan;
(b) The annuity provided must be supplemented to the ex-
tent necessary to provide the full retirement income
benefits in the basic form called for under the plan by
current payments to such employees as the benefits be-
come due; and
(c) Such supplemental payments can be made at any time
only if the full current costs of the plan have been met,
or the aggregate of such supplemental payments does
not exceed the aggregate employer contributions al-
ready made under the plan in the year then current.
If disability income benefits are provided under the plan, sim-
ilar provisions may be made for the current payment of such
benefits.
The restrictions required for the first ten years of a plan's
existence are similarly applicable to amendments which increase
substantially the extent of possible discrimination in benefits ac-
tually payable in the event of subsequent termination of the plan
or the subsequent discontinuance of contributions thereunder.
The restrictions apply as though a new plan were established on
the date of amendment. 65 The provision that the unrestricted
amount of employer contribution be at least $20,000, however, is
applicable to the aggregate amount contributed by the employer
for the particular employee from the date of establishment of the
original plan. Furthermore, for the purpose of determining
whether the employee's anticipated annual pension exceeds $1,500,
both the employer's contributions prior to amendment and those
expected to be made subsequently for that employee are to be
taken into account.
Curtailments
A curtailment is a modification of a plan that reduces ben-
efits or employer contributions, or narrows coverage, or makes the
vesting provisions less liberal.66 An amendment converting a
noncontributory plan to one requiring employee contributions,
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4(c)(5) (1971).
66. Rev. Rul. 69-24, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 110, 111.
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but providing the same benefits, is a curtailment. Similarly, a
plan is curtailed when it is amended to increase the waiting
period for acquiring vested rights. Because curtailment is a par-
tial termination of the plan, criteria applicable to terminations,
i.e., valid business reason and absence of prohibited discrimina-
tion, are similarly applicable to curtailments.
As was true of terminations, the mere fact that a plan is cur-
tailed does not necessarily result in adverse tax consequences. For
example, the amendment of a plan integrated at the maximum
compensation level for old-age and survivor insurance benefits
under the Social Security Act into an all-coverage plan, but re-
ducing vesting or benefits, may be acceptable. Although substan-
tial changes may have been effected, the employer's overall
cost may be the same or more than before the amendment. The
requirement of a valid business reason would therefore be met
and, since prohibited discrimination would not result because of
the larger coverage, the amendment would be satisfactory.
If both coverage and the waiting period for vesting are ex-
tended, however, prohibited discrimination may result. For ex-
ample, in a plan ostensibly covering all employees, but provid-
ing vested rights only for those who have completed fifteen years
of service and stay on to normal retirement age sixty-five, only
the stockholder-employees will benefit where the others are migra-
tory workers and rarely return after one season.67
A curtailment limiting contributions or benefits for upper-
echelon employees does not result in prohibited discrimination.
Thus, where a ceiling on compensation is applied, only the bene-
fits for those compensated above the applicable portion will be af-
fected, and since they are the highly compensated employees, no
adverse tax consequences result.68
Discontinuances and Suspensions
Plans may be terminated via the slow death process of dis-
continuing contributions. Although the formal steps for termina-
tion have not been taken, the result is the same unless the process
is reversed and contributions are resumed. Employees who become
eligible to enter the plan subsequent to the discontinuance re-
ceive no benefits, and no additional benefits attributable to em-
ployer contributions accrue to participants. The same requisites
that apply to terminations are therefore equally applicable to dis-
67. Rev. Rul. 71-263, 1971-1 CuM. BULL. 125; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 4(i),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 72.
68. Rev. Rul. 69-24, Situation 5, 1969-1 CuM. BULL. 110, 112.
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continuances. Vesting of employee rights is required in both
cases. 69
A suspension is a temporary cessation of contributions,
rather than a permanent discontinuance. If contributions are re-
sumed within a reasonable period and deficiencies are made up,
the employees probably will not be hurt by the suspension. If
the period is prolonged, however, or if contributions are made
in insufficient amounts, a suspension may ripen into a discon-
tinuance.
Benefits under a pension or annuity plan must not be af-
fected at any time by a suspension. Additionally, the unfunded
cost at any time must not exceed the sum of the unfunded past
service cost at the inception of the plan and any additional past
service or supplemental costs that may have been added by amend-
ment. The unfunded past service cost at any time will include
any unfunded prior normal cost and unfunded interest on any
unfunded cost.7" If the benefits are not affected and if the cost
has not increased, the requirement for vesting is not applicable
and the status of a prior determination as to the qualification of
the plan is not adversely affected by the suspension.7'
Where, however, the benefits are affected or the unfunded
cost has increased, the case is treated as a termination or cur-
tailment of the plan. The trustee must notify the District Di-
rector of Internal Revenue of the situation. A determination
will then be made as to the tax effects and the trustee will be
advised.72 If a valid reason is found to exist and prohibited dis-
crimination does not result, the qualification of the plan will not
be adversely affected.
Contributions to a profit-sharing plan must be recurring and
substantial. 73  This does not mean that employer contributions
must be made every year, or in the same amount, or at the same
rate. A single or occasional contribution out of profits, however,
does not satisfy the requirement that the plan be permanent.
Where contributions are made while the upper-echelon employees
are practically the only participants, but are discontinued when
others become eligible, prohibited discrimination arises.74  A de-
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6 (1971);
Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 6(d), 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 79.
70. Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 6(d) (1), 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 79.
71. Rev. Rul. 56-596, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 288.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1971); Rev. Rul. 69-252, 1969-1 CuM.
BULL. 128.
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (1971).
74. Rev. Rul. 66-251, 1966-2 CUM. BULL. 121, announcing that the In-
ternal Revenue Service will not follow the decision in Sherwood Swan and Co.,
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termination as to whether a suspension of contributions under a
profit-sharing plan constitutes a discontinuance is made upon
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
If, under the terms of a profit-sharing plan, authority is
specifically reserved to discontinue contributions without terminat-
ing the trust, the plan must also contain an appropriate provision
granting participants fully vested rights upon discontinuance of
contributions by the employer. The rule is similar to the rule for
actual termination.75
Order of Distribution
A qualified plan must provide that upon its termination,
or upon complete discontinuance of contributions thereunder, the
rights of each employee to benefits accrued to the date of such
termination or discontinuance, to the extent then funded, or the
rights to the amounts credited, are nonforfeitable. 76  The plan
must also provide for the allocation of any previously unallo-
cated funds to participants upon termination or complete discon-
tinuance of contributions.77 Any provision for the allocation of
unallocated funds is acceptable if it specifies the method to be used
and does not result in prohibited discrimination. The allocation
may be in cash or in the form of other benefits provided under
the plan.
As long as the prohibited discrimination does not result, the
allocation need not necessarily benefit all participants. Thus,
the funds may be used to provide benefits in accordance with
some order of priority.7 8  For example, benefits might be pro-
vided first, for retirees, second, for those eligible to retire and re-
ceive benefits, third, for those over age sixty, and so on for those
in progressively younger age groups until the funds are fully ex-
hausted.
A qualified trusteed pension plan may contain a provision
permitting the employer to recover at termination of the trust any
Ltd. v. Commissioner, 352 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1965) aff'g 42 T.C. 299 (1964),
holding that if, when adopted, a profit-sharing plan and trust meet all the re-
quirements of the statute and the regulations, then the trust continues to be
exempt from tax even though contributions to the trust cease altogether and,
because of the employee dropouts, the group in whose favor discrimination is
prohibited is likely to receive the most of the benefits upon termination of the
trust.
75. Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 6(d)(2), 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 79; Rev. Rul.
56-596, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 288.
76. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401(a)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a)(1)
(1971).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(a)(2) (1971).
78. Rev. Rul. 71-314, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 208; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 6(b),
1969-2 CUM. BULL. 59, 78.
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balance remaining in the trust which is due to erroneous actuarial
computations during the previous life of the trust.79  In the case
of a qualified nontrusteed annuity plan, a definite written ar-
rangement between the employer and the insurer must provide
that refunds of premiums, if any, shall be applied within the
taxable year of the employer in which received, or within the
next succeeding taxable year, toward the purchase of retirement
annuities under the plan.8°  Any dividends, or experience credits
similar to dividends, or surrender or cancellation credits, made
after permanent discontinuance of contributions and after all re-
tirement annuities with respect to service prior to discontinuance
of the plan have been purchased, may be paid to the employer.
However, they must be paid as soon as they are determined to the
degree that is practicable, so that no substantial accumulation
results. 8 ' This treatment is similar to that provided for in the
case of a termination of an exempt pension trust permitting re-
turn to the employer of any surplus funds arising from erroneous
actuarial computations.
CONCLUSION
There has been considerable activity recently elucidating and
applying established pension and profit-sharing requisites, espe-
cially as they apply to specific factual situations in the areas here
considered. An analysis of the principles involved has been pre-
sented so that it will serve as a guide to establishing and main-
taining plans in qualified status.
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b)(1) (1971).
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-8(a)(3) (1971).
81. Rev. Rul. 71-297, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 213; Rev. Rul. 69-421, pt. 3(f),
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 59, 69.
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